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This paper measures the 2007–13 evolution of employment tax rates in the U.K. and
the U.S. The U.S. changes are greater, in the direction of taxing a greater fraction of
the value created by employment, and primarily achieved with new implicit tax
rates. Even though both countries implemented a temporary “fiscal stimulus,” their
tax rate dynamics were different: the U.S. stimulus increased rates, whereas the U.K.
stimulus reduced them. The U.K. later increased the tax on employment during its
“austerity” period. Tax rate measurements are a first ingredient for cross-country
comparisons of labor markets during and after the financial crisis.
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Many countries of the world experienced an unusually deep and long recession after
2007. Over the same time frame, several facets of fiscal policy were changed, especially
policies related to taxation and safety net programs. The purpose of this paper is to
compare changes in fiscal policy parameters as they affected the incentives of middle-
class Americans and British to be employed. The U.K. had a “stimulus programme”
followed by an “austerity programme.” The U.S. federal government also passed what
it called a “stimulus package,” followed by a major health reform.
Policy labels acquired during legislative processes are not necessarily indicative of eco-
nomic fundamentals. This paper comparably quantifies fiscal policy in terms of one of the
fundamentals: the wedge between the supply price of labor and the demand price of labor.
It finds that the two countries have been different in terms of the evolution of employment
taxation, on average and across demographic groups. The American stimulus reduced
average incentives to be employed by increasing cash and health benefits for the un-
employed and for families with low incomes, whereas the British stimulus did the opposite
by temporarily reducing its value-added tax rate and permanently reducing its basic in-
come tax rate. The British austerity program pushed incentives in the opposite direction
as its stimulus by permanently increasing its payroll and value-added tax rates.
The evolution of employment has also been different in the two countries. Figure 1
displays an index of each country’s employment rates for prime-aged people.1
Employment fell sharply in both countries during the crisis, although less so in the U.K.
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Fig. 1 The Evolution of Employment Rates in Two Countries
Mulligan IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:23 Page 2 of 27employment rate had exceeded pre-crisis levels. Because taxes are one (among many) of
the determinants of labor market performance, comparable tax measures are necessary
for carefully investigating and comparing labor market outcomes. This paper provides tax
measures, and shows how changes in tax rates are linked to specific legislation.
Taxes potentially affect work decisions in a variety of dimensions, for example: the
number of weeks worked per year, the number of hours worked per week, whether to
work at all during a year, and the amount of effort to put into work. Due to the
prominence of the business cycle during this period and the sheer size of gross monthly
employment flows, this paper focuses on the weeks-per-year margin, holding constant
weekly hours and the probability of not working at all during a calendar year. In the
21stcentury U.K., for example, the single largest quarterly employment decline for the
non-elderly population has so far been 0.3 million, as compared to at least 2.6 million
non-elderly people who join or separate from an employer during the average quarter.2
Adding just one week out of work before joining, or after separating, would therefore
create a remarkable net reduction in the number employed at a point in time. Also, the
large majority of unemployment spells last less than 12 months, and some of those last-
ing 12 months do not blanket an entire tax year.3
I follow the usual steps of public finance analysis and first look at the tax wedge —
the gap between supply and demand prices created by a tax or subsidy. The next step,
left for future research, is to draw conclusions about the wedge’s behavioral effects and
ultimate incidence. Thus, with one exception noted below, the estimates in this paper
do not require any assumption about the relative incidence of labor taxes on employers
and employees.
Section 1 discusses the United Kingdom, demonstrating how many of the tax changes
were ultimately offsetting in terms of the employment incentives they created. The pri-
mary exception relates to the subpopulation receiving child tax credits, because the
phaseout (sometimes referred to as “taper”) rate of those credits increased with little
Mulligan IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:23 Page 3 of 27change in the range of incomes over which the phaseout applies. Section 2 shows
results for the United States, where employment disincentives have increased over time,
especially (but not exclusively) among unmarried workers. Section 3 shows the
evolution of the employer cost and employee benefit from work – the gap between the
two is the employment tax wedge – by country for workers in the middle of the wage
distribution.
2 Fiscal policy and the reward to work: the United Kingdom
2.1 A worker’s tax year budget constraint
My model of the U.K. worker features a consumption tax, payroll taxes (by both
employer and employee; hereafter, NICs or “National Insurance Contributions,” as they
are called in the U.K.), personal income taxes, benefits based on personal income (such
as working tax credits, child tax credits, and the child benefit), and benefits for the
unemployed (including, but not necessarily limited to, jobless and housing allowances).4
The weekly employer cost of worker i, yi, is the sum of weekly earnings wi and
employer payroll taxes (wi − ST)τf:
yi ¼ wi þ wi−STð Þτf ; ð1Þ
where τf denotes the marginal employer NICs rate and ST < y denotes the earningsthreshold for weekly employer NICs.
The personal income tax and personal-income-related benefits are based on tax-year
income (the tax year begins in April), but the NICs and unemployment benefits are
weekly. The link between consumption ci and weekly earnings wi therefore depends on
the number of weeks worked ni ∈ [0, 52]
5:
ci ¼ 52−nið ÞUBi þ wini− wi−PTð Þniτe−PIT 52−nið ÞUBi þ winið Þ−τcci; ð2Þ
where τe is the marginal employee NICs rate, UB denotes the weekly unemployment
benefit,6 and PIT(⋅) denotes the combined schedules for personal income taxes,
working tax credits, child tax credits, and the child benefit.7 PT < y denotes the
earnings threshold for weekly employee NICs. PT is known as the “primary threshold,”
as distinct from the “secondary threshold” ST applicable to employers.8 Equation (2)’s
last term refers to indirect or consumption taxes (primarily VAT, but also important
contributions from excise taxes: see Appendix I), which are levied as a fixed fraction τc
of consumption before tax. Combining (1) and (2), we have consumption as a function
of weekly employer cost and weeks worked:
1þ τcð Þci ¼ 52UBi þ 1−τe1þ τf yi þ










The consumption tax rate is assumed to be constant across workers, but UB varies
across workers due to family composition and housing expenses.
As indicated in equations (1) and (2), a fixed amount of earnings — the “primary” and
“secondary” thresholds (PT and ST, respectively) — can be earned without any NICs owed
by employee or employer.9 The NICs system is therefore equivalent to a truly flat-rate
payroll tax (specifically, without any PT or ST) plus a refund of a fixed amount
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ST) of earnings. Equation (3) separates the “flat-rate” component from the PT-ST-refund
component, with the former represented by the yi terms and the latter by the ratio with
PT and ST in the numerator.
The U.K. personal income tax is a function of personal income above the “personal
allowance.” There are multiple tax brackets, some of which are created by the phaseout
of the personal allowance. All of these are represented by my PIT notation.
Unlike U.S. Social Security contributions, the NICs thresholds and rates are adminis-
tered each pay period (e.g., weekly) without regard for earnings accumulated so far
during the tax year. As a result, equation (3)’s PT and ST terms enter the budget
constraint in the same way that the UB term does, except with the opposite sign. In
effect, the PT-ST-refund component of my two-part representation of the NICs is, by
itself, a weekly employment subsidy.
An additional week of employment creates value yi, some of which goes to the
employee (to finance additional consumption) and the rest of which goes to the public
treasury in the forms of additional taxes, credits not paid, and other benefits not paid.
The employment tax wedge qi is the public-treasury portion of this value, expressed as







1þ τc τc þ
τi þ τe þ τf










where τi denotes worker i’s PIT bracket. The PIT brackets vary across workers accord-ing to the amount they earn for the year, although a majority of workers are in the
“basic rate” bracket of 20 or 22 percent (depending on the year) plus, for some of the
basic-rate workers, a phaseout of tax credits.11
Equation (4) has a consumption-tax term multiplying the UB, PT, and ST terms (as
well as the others), thereby giving the impression that a consumption tax increase
would reduce the contribution of the UB, PT, and ST terms to the tax wedge. However,
because jobless allowances and the NICs thresholds are automatically indexed to
consumer-price inflation, and employer cost y is not, the contribution of these two
terms to the wedge is independent of the consumption tax as long as the consumption
tax is passed through one-for-one into consumer prices.12 To put it another way, the
consumption tax rate is expected to increase each ratio UB/y, PT/y, and ST/y in the
same proportion that it reduces the ratio 1/(1 + τc).
2.2 Legislative changes since 2007: wage income tax brackets
Each of equation (4)’s statutory parameters changed after 2007. Moreover, real em-
ployer costs y were changing relative to the sterling-denominated and inflation-
adjusted statutory parameters such as the jobless allowance and the PT. As I show
below, many of the parameter changes are offsetting — perhaps by design — in terms
of their effects on the employment tax wedge q. Because of the various offsets, the VAT
(value-added tax) and tax credit changes ultimately drive most of the changes in the
tax wedge.
Beginning at 17.5 percent, the standard VAT rate was temporarily cut to 15.0 percent for the
last month of 2008 and the entire calendar year of 2009.13 It was 17.5 percent again in 2010.
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VAT increases are especially interesting for the purposes of labor market analysis because a
VAT reduces the purchasing power of wages without reducing the purchasing power of jobless
benefits because the latter are indexed to the consumer price index (CPI).
The UK made several adjustments to its personal income tax on earnings, which has
been a three or four-bracket system (plus implicit brackets for the phaseouts of tax
credits and the personal allowance). Effective April 2008, the bottom two non-zero
brackets of 10 percent and 22 percent were combined into a single 20 percent bracket,
as it is today. Effective April 2010, the personal allowance was phased out beginning at
£100,000, and the upper bracket of 40 percent was split in two brackets: 40 percent
and 50 percent. A year later, the income threshold separating the 20 and 40 percent
bracket was cut by three percent in nominal terms (seven percent in real terms),
thereby creating a group of taxpayers who experienced a twenty percentage point in-
crease in their bracket. The 50 percent bracket rate was cut to 45 percent effective
April 2013.14
The 2010 income tax changes helped harmonize the PIT with the NICs and thereby
produce a more uniform combined marginal tax rate schedule among most full-year
workers. Figure 2 shows those combined rates (excluding tax credit phaseouts – more
on these below) as summarized on the vertical axis by the first ratio term inside
equation (4)’s parentheses. The horizontal axis shows employer cost, which is the sum
of the worker’s annual earnings and the employer NICs. The black-dotted schedule is
from tax year 2007. The schedule dips sharply between about £42,000 and £49,000 be-
cause those workers had exceeded the upper earnings limit for the NICs but still had
low enough income that their PIT bracket had not jumped from 20 to 40 percent.15 By
2009, these two thresholds were, up to rounding error, identical for a full-year worker.16
These rounding errors are seen as the thin spikes in the red and blue series.17Fig. 2 UK Income Tax Brackets, Combining PIT & NICs
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income threshold between the 20 and 40-percent PIT brackets only increased overall mar-
ginal rates by about 10 percentage points for taxpayers with incomes between the old and
new thresholds because much of their 20-point PIT marginal rate increase was offset by being
moved into a lesser marginal NICs rate.
Effective April 2011, one percentage point was added to both the employer NICs and the
employee NICs (HM Revenue and Customs 2014a). For the workers (they are a majority of
taxpayers and have annual employer cost between £7,000 and £43,000) that would have been
in the 22 percent personal income bracket under 2007 law, the additions to the marginal
NICs rate almost exactly offset the 2-percentage point PIT cut after 2007. As a result, the
solid-blue and black-dotted schedules almost coincide in that range, with the blue 2011
schedule located just 0.4 percentage points below the 2007 schedule.
Among the relatively few high-income taxpayers, the combined contribution of the
PIT and NICs changes has been to increase the employment tax wedge. The contribu-
tion of these PIT and NICs changes to the overall average employment tax wedge is es-
sentially zero.
In order to highlight the harmonization of the PIT and NICs brackets, Fig. 2 excludes the
phaseout of “tax credits.” Two main tax credits are paid to households: working tax credits
(WTCs) and child tax credits (CTCs). Both credits are a function of annual household in-
come and prorated according to the beneficiary’s payment period (weekly or every four
weeks).18 In 2014, the full credits apply for annual household incomes between £0 and £6,420
(HM Treasury 2013). The WTC is phased out between £6,420 and about £18,000, depending
on household circumstances, and at the same rate as the CTCs. Without beginning to count
spousal income or income from job seekers allowances, someone earning the median wage in
a full-time full-year job (hereafter “the median”) would earn about £23,000 and therefore not
receive any WTC on the weekly employment margin (4) unless he was out of work
much of the year and did not have significant income from other sources.19 For
this reason, this paper gives more attention to the CTCs, which are phased out
above annual household income of £18,000 (or so, depending on circumstances)
until about £26,000 for one child and £33,000 for two children.20
Figure 3 shows the income ranges over which CTCs were phased out, in selected years.
Relative to the median wage, the phase-out range widened somewhat between 2007 and
2013. By 2013, a household with 2 children could have an income of up to £32,400 (at the
median wage, an individual’s 2013 full-time full-year earnings would be only about £22,000)
and still be receiving some CTC.21 But the more significant change has been in the increase
in the phase-out rate from 37 percent to 41 percent. As I show below, these four percentage
points are a large part of the work incentive because already in 2007 workers paying the basic
rate and receiving CTC were keeping only 20 percent of their employer’s cost at the margin.
In summary, VAT rates, NICs parameters, personal income tax rules, and tax credit rules
all changed after 2007. The next step is to use equation (4) to determine the direction and
quantitative importance of the changes for incentives to be employed.2.3 Changes since 2007: overall employment tax rates
Employment during a week creates income for the tax year and for this reason alone creates
income and payroll tax liabilities — at the rates displayed in the previous section. In addition,
Fig. 3 U.K. Child Tax Credit phaseout ranges and rates
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citly taxed by the opportunity for unemployment benefits during weeks not working. The
economic importance of these three policy parameters, represented as UB, PT, and ST in
equations (3) and (4), varies inversely with employer cost y. Table 1 displays each of these pa-
rameters for tax years 2010 and 2011, when some of the larger changes went into effect.
The top three rows are the NICs parameters. Both employer and employee rates increased
between 2010 and 2011, which made each pound of primary and secondary threshold moreTable 1 Implicit Employment Taxes from NICs and the JSA, 2010 and 2011
Tax Year
Policy Parameter 2010 2011 Change Units
NICs
Employer rate 12.8% 13.8% 1.0% % of earnings above ST or PT
Employee rate 11.0% 12.0% 1.0%
Tax value of PT and ST 20.5 26.4 5.9 2010 British pounds per week
Job Seekers Allowance (tax adjusted)
51.8 51.2 −0.6 2010 British pounds per week
JSA minus Tax value of PT and ST
31.3 24.8 −6.5 2010 British pounds per week
6.5% 5.2% −1.4% Percentage of employer cost, FW
6.4% 5.3% −1.1% Percentage of employer cost, VW
Addenda
Basic rate for the PIT 20.0% 20.0 % 0.0% Percentage of taxable income
Employer cost 489 472 −17.5 2010 British pounds per 40-hour week,
at the median wage
The JSA and ST values are net of personal income taxes at the margin, assuming the basic rate. FW (“fixed weight”)
estimate uses the same 2010–11 average of employer cost for both years’ percentages. The VW (“variable weight”)
estimate uses the employer cost estimate from the same column as the reported percentage
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in the table’s third row, the combination of these changes resulted in a 5.9-pound increase in
the value (in terms of tax savings) of the primary threshold between 2010 and 2011, adjusted
for inflation.
The next row is the job seekers allowance (JSA). Adjusted for inflation, it fell about one
pound. The difference between the fourth and third rows is the net implicit weekly employ-
ment tax created by the JSA and NICs, holding annual income constant. It fell about seven
pounds per week, adjusted for inflation. Both the JSA and ST values are adjusted for personal
income taxes as specified by equation (4).
As with any employment tax, the economic importance of the employment taxes shown in
Table 1 depends on their magnitudes relative to the value created by a week of work, which I
measure as employer cost for a 40-h week at the median of the hourly wage distribution for
full-time workers.22 The next two rows in the Table therefore express the employment taxes
as a percentage of the 2010–11 average employer cost. By this measure of change, which is
entirely a function of the inflation-adjusted statutory parameters, employment tax rates fell
more than one percentage point between 2010 and 2011.
Real wages and real employer cost were falling during this period, which means that each
pound of implicit employment tax became economically more important over time. I account
for this change by using the variable-weight measures shown in the final row of the table,
which use year-specific employer cost for the ratios PT/y and UB/y. By comparison with the
previous row, we see that falling real employer cost partly, but not fully, offsets the contribu-
tion of the growing value of the NICs thresholds to the weekly employment tax.
The tax-wedge equation (4) features the sum of four terms inside the parentheses. Figure 4
displays the three non-consumption-tax terms as red, blue, and green,
respectively.23 For the purpose of calculating the JSA and PT/ST terms, y is taken
to be the weekly employer cost of the median worker (the same as in Table 1).Fig. 4 U.K. Employment tax components, 2007-13
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the same scale as the PIT-NIC term. The policy parameter changes noted above
are readily seen in the figure: the PIT’s basic rate reduction in 2008 (red series),
the 2011 addition to the NICs rates (red series), and the 2011 enhancement of the
value of the PT (green series). The PIT-NIC series ends the time period essentially
where it began, which leaves the net effect of the other two terms. The JSA term
rises because employer costs grow less than the CPI (likely the VAT hike had
something to do with that).
As with the other tax calculations in this paper, Fig. 4 does not include housing allowances
for the unemployed. The changes over time would be the same if housing allowances had
been included and stayed in a fixed proportion with the weekly employer cost of the median
worker. See Adam and Browne (2013) for discussion of housing allowance policy changes
and Appendix II for list of tax and benefit programs that are included in this paper’s
calculations.
Table 2’s first column lists all of the tax and benefit programs that contribute to my calcula-
tion of the U.K. employment tax wedge according to equation (4). Among basic rate payers
(of the personal income tax), the only reasons that the results of equation (4) vary across U.K.
workers are: (a) some are having their credits phased out while others are not, (b) they have
different employer cost y, and (c) persons who are both married and long-term unemployed
may receive more JSA than the others do. Of these, only the credit phaseouts are quantita-
tively important for determining incentive changes over time.24 Figure 5 puts all of equation
(4)’s pieces together and shows the log change in the after tax share (1-q) among married
basic-rate payers, separately by employer cost and credit-phaseout status.25 A low-wageTable 2 Tax and benefit programs included the rate calculations
United Kingdom United States
Payroll taxes (employer and employee)
National Insurance Contributions Old Age, Survivors, Disability, Medicare
Personal Income Taxes
Four-bracket structure Ordinary federal tax (without credits)a
Ordinary state tax (without credits)a









Working Tax Credit Food stamps (SNAP)
Child Tax Credit Medicaida
Child Benefitc Debt discharges
All othera
aTreated as a time-invariant parameter
bU.S. consumption taxes only appear in Fig. 7 (to the extent that they are reflected in the price deflator for Personal
Consumption Expenditures)
cAssumed to be independent of income and employment status for the workers represented
Fig. 5 U.K. Weekly Employment Incentives, 2007-13
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worker, respectively.26
Among those with credits fully phased out (dashed series in Fig. 5), the changes are essen-
tially the same for low- and high-wage workers. The dashed series end in 2013 about where
they began because the consumption tax increase (driven by the VAT change) tends to offset
the combined reduction represented as the sum of Fig. 4’s three series. The low-wage dashed
series finished slightly above the high-wage series because the £5 weekly reduction in the tax
value of (JSA− tax value of PT and ST) is a somewhat greater percentage of employer cost
for low-wage employees. Both series have a temporary increase in 2008 and 2009 because of
the temporary VAT cut and because the PIT’s basic rate cut was sudden, and sooner, com-
pared with the changes in employer cost and the higher NICs rates that would come later.
The solid series shows incentive changes for “on-credits” individuals with a decision to
work one week more (or less) during the year that affects the amount of their child tax credit.
Specifically, on-credits individuals receive a credit if they work more, but less credit than they
would receive if working less. For them, the reward to working falls significantly because the
benefit reduction rate after 2010 was four points greater than it was in 2007 when their after-
tax share was already as low as 20 percent. The increase in 2008 and 2009 is less than it is for
those “off credits” because the benefit reduction rate increase in 2008 was offsetting the con-
temporaneous cut in the basic rate. Lesser employment disincentives emerge for low-wage
workers because the combined value of the NICs thresholds is a nontrivial incentive for them
to work and this value increased after 2007 (recall Fig. 4’s green PT/ST series).
As shown in Fig. 3, the threshold for CTCs did not change in exact proportions with the
median wage, which means that even a worker whose wage tracked the median might receive
credits in later years but not in earlier years, or vice versa. Figure 5 omits such workers, but
their incentive changes would be massive because equation (4) evaluated without credit
phaseout is about 55 percent whereas the value with credit phaseout exceeds 80 percent.
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relative to the median wage.
Although payroll taxes, sales taxes, and personal income taxes do not combine the income
of spouses in order to determine the rate that applies, tax credits do. This by itself tends to in-
crease the likelihood of unmarried workers to be on credits. However, because cohabiting un-
married persons are treated as married for tax credit purposes, and couples are more likely to
have children, single workers are not more likely to be on credits. For example, in the tax year
beginning April 2011, workers claiming tax credits as singles were only 23 percent of all
adults in working families with credits (HM Revenue and Customs 2013a, Table 2.1, counting
husband and wife separately). By comparison, 42 percent of adults in the U.K. were neither
married nor cohabiting.27
2.4 Comparison with previous studies
Adam and Browne (2013) also look at changes in work incentives between 2010 and (their
forecast for) 2015. Our studies have two major differences — the baseline against which pol-
icies are compared and the types of individuals considered — as well as a more subtle differ-
ence in the type of incentive(s) that we measure. On the first point, both their paper and
mine note that “earnings have increased less quickly than benefit rates, which tends to make
working less attractive” (Adam and Browne (2013), p. 1). Equivalently, benefit rates have in-
creased more than wage rates: is that a policy change or not? This is merely a question of def-
inition, and I refer to any change in benefit rates relative to wages as a policy change even if
prior law would have it that way. Moreover, because benefit rates have increased relative to
wages but decreased relative to the Retail Price Index (RPI, which prior law had used for
indexing benefits), policy reduced the reward to work by my definition (ignoring the other
statutory changes noted above).
The second difference from Adam and Browne (2013) is that my sample excludes persons
not working at all during the year, whereas Adam and Browne’s include them. The difference
is important because “The majority of the welfare reforms involve changing the maximum
amount of means-tested support that can be received by those with no other income” (Adam
and Browne (2013), p. 10). Persons not working at all during a tax year may not be close to
the margin for working in the short run and are thereby less interesting for short-run behav-
ioral analysis, although excluding them altogether (as I do) errs in the opposite direction.28 I
look at a variety of skill levels, but, unlike Adam and Browne, not deviations from the median
wage that are so large that some of the workers are still receiving working tax credits.
The reward to working an additional week examined in this paper has a lot in common
with the reward to earning more per week, which Adam and Browne (2013) call the EMTR,
except that the latter does not reflect foregone unemployment benefits or the value of the
NICs’ thresholds. As a result, they find the EMTR to be essentially constant after 2010,
whereas my reward measure falls somewhat, in part because of the contribution of foregone
unemployment benefits.29
Because the labor market features a rich variety of circumstances and alternative work situ-
ations, all of the tax rate measures are relevant for behavioral analysis. The additional-week
measure deserves some attention for the purpose of understanding employee and employer
decisions of how long to maintain a job or to endure a period of joblessness, which are deci-
sions that are relevant for business cycle purposes. My paper is also unique in its display of
year-to-year tax-wedge dynamics after 2007.
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report comparatively higher levels (80+ percent is not uncommon) because of my focus
on the weekly employment margin (e.g., including JSA as an implicit tax) and perhaps
because of my treatment of indirect taxes. Appendix I details my measurement of, and
economic assumptions about, various indirect taxes.
3 Fiscal policy and the reward to work: the United States
The U.S. and the U.K. have broadly similar policy types affecting the reward to work: payroll
taxes, personal income taxes, consumption taxes, unemployment benefits, and safety net pro-
gram benefits (recall Table 2). But they differ in terms of administrative details. The U.S. pay-
roll tax, alternately known as “Social Security contributions” or “old age, survivors, disability,
and hospital insurance contributions,” is administered on a calendar-year basis — as com-
pared to weekly (or pay period) in the U.K. — and has no analogue to the primary and sec-
ondary thresholds. The U.S. personal income tax is also administered on a calendar-year
basis, and has a bracket structure broadly similar to the U.K.’s, including an annual amount
that can be earned free from personal income tax.
The U.S. personal income tax includes an “Earned Income Tax Credit” (EITC) that roughly
resembles the U.K.’s Working and Child Tax Credits.30 In both countries, working full-time
full-year at or near the median wage would still qualify a person for a partial credit, at least if
she had two qualifying children. The EITC is phased out at 7.7 percent for those without chil-
dren, 16.0 percent for one-child, 21.1 percent for more than one child, as compared to 41
percent for the U.K. tax credits (Tax Policy Center 2014, rounded to the nearest tenth of a
percentage point). Unlike the U.K. credit phase-out rate, the EITC phase-out rates did not
change after 2007. The EITC phase-out ranges were little changed (see Mulligan 2012 for
more discussion of temporary changes to EITC amounts and thresholds). Other safety net
programs such as Supplemental Security Income and TANF affect tax-wedge levels, but not
tax-wedge changes, because the programs did not have significant changes in their eligibility
or benefit rules. For these reasons, the estimates here of the changes in U.S. work incentives
after 2007 consider only food stamps, UI and related programs, health insurance assistance
and the payroll tax (more on these below).
The U.S. unemployment insurance (UI) program offers weekly cash benefits to people who
have lost their jobs and have as yet been unable to start a new one. The benefits expire after
six months, even if the claimant continues to be out of work, although the time of expiration
has been extended during recessions, especially the most recent one. Because UI is contingent
on employment status, it is implicitly an employment tax, as it is in the U.K. The U.S. cash-
benefit system has, at times, included additional kinds of assistance, as noted below.
The governments in both countries spend on healthcare, but in the U.S. the assistance cre-
ates disincentives because it is income and/or employment tested. Prior to 2014, the bulk of
this assistance for nonelderly people came from the Medicaid program, which is jointly ad-
ministered by state and federal governments. In this paper’s study of incentives 2007–13, Me-
dicaid is treated as a tax on income (and thereby employment) that is constant over time and
disproportionately applicable to unmarried and low-income people.
The Department of Agriculture’s food stamp program, now known as Supplemental Nutri-
tion Assistance (SNAP), provides funds to low-income households for the purpose of buying
food. SNAP benefits are potentially available to households earning less than 130 percent of
the prior year poverty line, which is adjusted every fiscal year according to the rate of
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ship, and the program required states to ensure that a sufficient fraction of the able-bodied
adult participants were employed.
With the exception of a partial payroll tax holiday in 2011 and 2012, few American tax-
payers saw a significant change in the personal income or payroll tax rules during the years
2007–13. But several safety net benefit rules were changed after 2007 in ways that created
new implicit taxes on earnings and employment. Most of those rule changes related to un-
employment insurance and SNAP.
A variety of legislation after 2007 temporarily and significantly added to the weekly amount
of benefits and the duration of time that they could be received, and thereby temporarily in-
creased the tax wedge on employment.32 New legislation also made it easier to claim benefits.
Before the recession, the amount of the UI benefit was about half of the amount earned on
the prior job, up to a state-specific cap amount that tends to be about 60 percent of the me-
dian wage. Although the benefit amounts prior to the recession tended to be proportional to
earnings on the job held before the unemployment spell, the temporary benefit additions
were either fixed weekly dollar amount or a fixed amount of in-kind assistance. Thus, with re-
spect to the employment tax wedge equation (4), the UI benefit rule changes have a lot in
common with an increase in the UB term, which tends to be more significant for low-skill
workers (they have a lesser value for employer cost y). The benefit-duration and other
eligibility changes look more like an increase in UB that is proportional to y, at
least for unemployed persons receiving less than the benefit cap.
A variety of legislation in and around the recession effectively eliminated some of the long-
standing barriers to SNAP eligibility and participation, leaving primarily the household in-
come test. The time interval for the income test is not required to be the calendar year, which
means that now many workers who are not poor or near poor while they are employed can
qualify for food stamps during periods that they are out of work. In this regard, the food
stamp rule changes have a lot in common with an increase in equation (4)’s UB term. As
such, the increase is more significant for low-skill workers. However, the UB change associ-
ated with food stamps is less important for married workers because the program’s income
test considers the sum of husband and wife income.
Figure 6 shows Mulligan’s (2013) results for incentive changes between 2007 and 2010
among non-elderly household heads and spouses, as a function of marital status and potential
monthly earnings, and rescaled to focus on the employment margin.33 Figure 6 defines a per-
son’s potential earnings to be what each person would earn in a month of full-time work, as
predicted by their demographic characteristics in a Current Population Survey sample of full-
time working non-elderly household heads and spouses. The middle group in each marital
status category has weekly earnings potential of $727 plus fringes (that is, $3,148 per month
plus fringes), which is what the median employed non-elderly household head and spouse
earned in constant (fiscal year 2010) dollars during the 2007 Current Population Survey refer-
ence weeks. The other groups have weekly earnings potential of $487, $595, $887, and $1084,
which differ from the middle group’s potential by about −0.4, −0.2, 0.2, and 0.4 log points,
respectively. The vertical axis measures the change in the tax on working in percentage points
of employer cost.34 The figure also decomposes each group’s employment wedge change into
the contributions of five types of program expansions.
All groups had their work incentives eroded between 2007 and 2010, but the amount was
less for married people. In percentage points, the changes are fairly uniform across married
Fig. 6 Components of 2007-10 Employment Tax Wedge Changes
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although the most skilled unmarried groups still have a change that is similar to even the
less-skilled married groups. In contrast, the more meaningful distinction in the U.K. is
having children, because that raises the possibility of having a partial child tax
credit and the 41 percent phase-out rate that goes with it. British workers without
children have incentive changes that are hardly correlated with skill (and close to zero for
the full period 2007–13, as seen in Fig. 5 by comparing the two dashed series.
Some of the lesser temporary American program expansions began to expire in 2010, al-
though a significant fraction of the temporary elevation of work disincentives remained until
December 2013 when the maximum allowed duration of unemployment benefits returns to
its pre-recession level. But that did not return work disincentives to their previous levels, be-
cause some of the expansions of food stamps and unemployment insurance were permanent,
or at least long lived.35
More important, the 2010 Affordable Care Act began in 2014 to pay its most significant
health insurance subsidies. These subsidies are both income tested and employment tested,
and for both reasons have sharply increased work disincentives relative to what they would
have been without the law (Mulligan 2014).36 Holding age constant, the ACA disincentives
are greater for low-skill workers, even among married workers. Somewhat fewer married-
worker disincentives are created by the ACA, but not to the degree as with the temporary
programs featured in Fig. 5. The disincentives are not monotone with age because older
workers are more skilled but also have greater health expenses that can be subsidized (Mulli-
gan 2015a).
4 Conclusions
The U.S. and the U.K. implemented different fiscal policy changes in the years following the
worldwide financial crisis. The U.S. created or expanded a number of safety net programs that
Mulligan IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:23 Page 15 of 27eroded the reward to work by adding to implicit employment and income taxes. The U.S. im-
plicit tax changes were faced by a large number of workers, but the disincentives were most
pronounced among unmarried workers. The U.K. changes 2007–13 were less, even for the
relatively small fraction of the workforce facing the new and higher tax credit phase-out rate.
The U.K. had a fiscal stimulus package too, but it involved cutting marginal tax rates on both
personal income and consumption. This difference suggests that the labor market effects of
stimulus packages may differ significantly in magntitude, if not direction, according to the
microeconomic incentives that they create.
The U.K. tax wedge increased later during the so-called austerity period, leaving it about
where it was before the recession, at least for workers not receiving tax credits. High-income
taxpayers are not the focus of this paper, but the results herein show that the U.K. was unique
by significantly increasing marginal income tax rates for some of them during the 2007–13
time frame. This suggests that benefit-cutting policies may increase marginal tax rates, espe-
cially if the benefit cuts primarily relate to people with relatively high employment rates or in-
comes. Ironically, both austerity and stimulus may create work disincentives.
Figure 7’s dotted series display quarterly indexes of real employer cost for the median
American worker (blue) and the median British worker (red). The purpose of showing em-
ployer cost is to show the “before-tax wage,” so the British series is deflated with an adjusted
CPI that reflects what the CPI would be if the value-added tax rate had remained constant.37
Both series are calculated relative to a 0.5 percent per year trend, which is the trend that is
consistent with the U.S. average growth rate of total factor productivity during the four years
prior to the recession. One difference between the two countries is that employer cost rose
somewhat above trend in the U.S., while it fell below trend in the U.K. It is also notable that
the downward trend of real British employer cost is fairly linear once we adjust for the
consumption tax rate (as in Fig. 7).Fig. 7 The Two Prices of Labor, by Country
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as a reward for their working. The two solid series are an index of the employee reward, cal-
culated as employer cost times one minus the employment tax wedge.38 The British reward
series temporarily moves above the corresponding employer cost series as the U.K. temporar-
ily cut its VAT tax and made personal income tax rate cuts a couple of years before other
types of rate increases would be implemented. Ultimately the two U.K. series finish close to
each other because the employment tax wedge ultimately returns near to what it was in
2007. The U.S. follows a very different pattern, with the reward index falling far below the
employer cost index in the early years of the recession.
The two countries’ reward indices finish near each other: well below trend. However, be-
cause the two reward indices fall below trend for fundamentally different economic reasons,
we should not expect employment changes in the two countries to have much in common.
The British reward fell below trend because employer cost fell below trend, whereas the
American reward fell below trend because of a tax wedge that was greater at the end of the
period than it was before the recession. The tax wedge is symptomatic of redistribution,
which has an aggregate income effect on labor supply of ambiguous sign and probably small
magnitude. To the extent that falling employer cost in the U.K. reflects low productivity
growth or an adverse change in the country’s international terms of trade, it has income
and substitution effects on labor supply that go in opposite directions.
In this way, country-specific employment tax wedge time series are a first of many
ingredients for cross-country comparisons of labor market dynamics during and after the fi-
nancial crisis. At this point, the results of this paper at least suggest the possibility that differ-
ent fiscal policies in the U.S. and U.K. may have contributed to the different employment
dynamics shown in Fig. 1.
Endnotes
1Both series are from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(hereafter, OECD), via the St. Louis Federal Reserve’s FRED database. In 2007-Q4, the U.K.
and U.S. employment rates were 81.5 and 79.8, respectively.
2Average quarterly gross flows are from Gomes (2012, Fig. 1), for 1996 through 2010.
Quarterly net employment changes are from the OECD, via the St. Louis Federal Reserve’s
FRED database and, for comparability with Gomes, for the age 16–64 age group.
3The St. Louis Federal Reserve FRED data series UEMPMED shows that the U.S. me-
dian duration of unemployment peaked at 25 weeks in June 2010. Also note that, for
example, an 18-month nonemployment spell lasting from March 2009 to
September 2010 nonetheless involves positive weeks worked in both calendar
years (tax years in the U.S. coincide with calendar years).
4Note that so-called “tax credits” are technically welfare spending programs in the
U.K. rather than a credit to personal income taxes (Office for Budget Responsibility
2015, Tables 4.5 and 4.26). Both tax credits and personal income taxes are based on the
same income concept, which this paper references as “personal income.” However, tax
credits are claimed jointly by couples and based on their combined income (HM
Revenue and Customs 2009b), whereas the personal income tax is based on individual
income (HM Government 2015c).
5I ignore integer constraints on weeks worked. Also note that many of the tax provi-
sions are administered on a pay-period basis (e.g., weekly, biweekly or monthly). For a
Mulligan IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:23 Page 17 of 27worker paid monthly, my model might be better understood as a monthly model: e.g.,
w is monthly employer cost, n ∈ [0,12] is number of months worked, etc.
6UBi is zero for someone who is not a job seeker during the weeks that they are not
employed. Job seekers allowances are taxable by the personal income tax, which is why
the UB term also appears inside the PIT term.
7I abstract from the fact that the personal income tax schedule varies across workers
according to their nonlabor income. I also do not model council tax credits. Over the
range of family situations considered in this paper, the child benefit (not to be confused
with the child tax credit) is a flat amount and thereby does not create work disincen-
tives at the margin.
8Technically, the thresholds are different for employee and employer. In fact, PT = ST
in 2001–10 and 2014 and within 1–3 pounds per week (out of 139 or more) in the
intervening years (HM Revenue and Customs, 2014a).
9As with the U.S. Social Security contributions, the U.K. caps a significant part of its
NICs, except that the U.K. caps are administered per pay period (e.g., weekly) rather
than annually. The capped payments, beginning at what is known as the “upper
earnings limit” (UEL) is about 75 percent more than the median weekly earnings of
full-time employees. The UEL and its changes are discussed below in connection with
personal income tax thresholds.
10This is a wedge between productivity y (on the margin of weeks worked) and the
worker’s marginal benefit. In a static model such as equation (2), the latter is the mar-
ginal effect on consumption ∂c/∂n. However, especially when tax rates vary over time, a
worker in a dynamic model may take some of the benefit in terms of future consump-
tion or leisure. In either model, the worker’s marginal benefit can be interpreted as the
marginal rate of consumption-leisure substitution (in utility) and the tax wedge (4),
calculated in this paper, is properly compared with the “labor wedge” measured from
household behavior (Mulligan 2012). As always, it should, for the purpose of this
comparison, be noted whether the consumption expenditure ingredient in the labor
wedge includes sales taxes. Also note that the tax wedge (4) includes both marginal tax
rates faced by workers as well as taxes that add to employer costs.
11HM Revenue and Customs (2014c, Table 2.1).
12Unemployment benefits were once indexed to the Retail Prices Index and now to
the Consumer Price Index. This paper does not isolate the short-term incentive
consequences of that change.
13For the dates of VAT rate changes see HM Revenue and Customs (2014b) and
KPMG (2013).
14For the rate changes noted in this paragraph, see HM Revenue and Customs
(2014d, 2014e).
15The upper earnings limit is analogous to the American earnings cap — a much
lower NICs rate applies above the cap. Note that the upper earnings limit (£817 per
week after the cut) was significantly above median weekly earnings.
16Even after 2008, the two thresholds were not harmonized for part-year workers (see
Appendix II) because the NICs are administered according to the pay interval, whereas
the personal income tax is based on year-to-date earnings.
17The threshold between the 20 and 40 percent brackets is an annual income amount
and is not necessarily evenly divisible by 52 weeks. At the lowest incomes, the PIT and
Mulligan IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:23 Page 18 of 27NICs became less harmonized for full-year workers because the PIT’s personal allow-
ance is no longer equal to 52 times the NICs’ primary threshold. This change is
reflected in Fig. 2 for annual employer cost below £11,000 as 2009–11 schedules that
go from 0 percent to 30 or more in multiple (albeit, barely visible) steps.
18The tax credits are paid directly to beneficiaries (HM Government 2015a) whereas
personal income taxes and NICs are administered through employers.
19The quarterly time series for the median hourly wage among full-time employees is
from Office for National Statistics (2014a). See also HM Revenue and Customs (2009a),
which gives an example of a couple each working part-time schedules throughout the
tax year but nonetheless receiving zero WTC because their annual income, although
low by the standards of the median family, is still too high.
20The child tax credits are not contingent on work. In principle, the working tax
credits (WTCs) are withheld during weeks not at work (with an exception for a four-
week spell in between jobs). As a result, if annual income qualifies a worker for a posi-
tive WTC, the WTC has both a positive and negative effect on the weekly employment
tax wedge. The positive-tax effect comes from the effect of a week’s employment on
annual income and therefore the weekly amount of WTC to be received during times
of employment. The magnitude of the positive tax effect depends on the phase-out rate
and the number of weeks during the year the person is at work (i.e., equation (4) itself
would depend on n). The negative-tax effect comes from the withholding of WTC
payments during weeks not employed and, for the reasons noted below, is not relevant
for my calculations.
21For simplicity, Fig. 2 assumes that, for all years 2007–13, the phaseout of the family
element of the CTC begins exactly at the income level for which the rest of the CTC is
exhausted. In practice, this harmonization of phaseout ranges did not take effect until
2012. Before that, there were incomes for which all of the child element, but none of
the family element, was phased out. Note that Fig. 2’s simplifying assumption is of little
quantitative significance because the amount of the family element is less than one
quarter of the full CTC amount.
22Weekly employer cost is taken to be 40*(median hourly wage) + (weekly employer
NICs, accounting for the secondary threshold).
23The (2010 and 2011 values of the) sum of Fig. 4’s blue and green series is shown in
the last row of Table 1.
24Item (c) refers to the income-based JSA, which is examined in Appendix II. The rest of
the paper considers only the contributory JSA, the amount of which does not depend on
marital status (HM Government 2015b).
25For some behavioral analysis, the JSA’s should be discounted relative to the PT be-
cause the PT affects all workers, whereas only some of those out of work receive a JSA.
During this period, however, changes in JSA per capita were very close in magnitude to
changes in both employment and unemployment (BBC 2015, Office for National Statis-
tics 2014b). Also note that the level of q matters for Fig. 5, which means that the mag-
nitude of the changes would tend to be greater if housing allowances were included in
my estimates.
26For low-wage workers, the withholding of WTC during weeks of nonemployment may
be relevant, even while it is not included in my calculations. There are a couple of reasons
why it might not be relevant: (a) the worker’s WTC is zero because annual family income is
Mulligan IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:23 Page 19 of 27at least 80 percent of full-time full-year earnings at the median hourly wage, (b) the worker’s
spell between jobs is four weeks or less, or (c) the worker does not or cannot claim WTC
even during weeks of employment (e.g., because the spouse already claims the credit). More-
over, even when relevant, the withholding of WTC hardly effects incentive changes over time
because the WTC amount was not significantly changed relative to wages. Beginning in 2013,
the child benefit (not to be confused with tax credits) began to be phased out based on the
annual income of the adult receiving it. This is a new disincentive for workers with annual
incomes between £50,000 and £60,000, which is more than twice the annual income ob-
tained by working full-time full-year at the median hourly wage (among full-time
workers). As a result, the new disincentive, which can add significantly more than ten per-
centage points to the marginal tax rate, depending on the number of children, is not
reflected in any of this paper’s exhibits.
27The numerator of the 58 percent (which is 100 minus the 42 percent cited in the text) is
from Office for National Statistics (2012) and the denominator from Office for National Sta-
tistics (2013, ages 20 and over, plus 4/5ths of persons aged 15–19). In the last year that cou-
ples jointly filed personal tax returns (1989), 72 percent of persons filing returns (counting
husbands and wives separately) were filing unmarried returns (HM Revenue and Customs
2015). The same sources indicate that 8.7 million adults received tax credits in, say, 2011–12,
whereas 30.8 million filed personal income tax returns.
28It is also difficult to know what a person not working during the tax year would have
earned if he had worked. This problem is alleviated, but not absent, in samples of workers;
we do not know for sure what a worker would have earned if he had gone back to work a
week earlier or had left employment a week later.
29Adam and Browne (2013), as well as OECD (2012), also calculate the reward to working
a full tax year rather than not working at all. An increase in, say, the personal allowance does
not affect the reward to working an additional week except for the small group of people
who are working so little during the year that they have not used up their personal allowance.
Or consider a person earning, for the tax year, in the 20-percent bracket with an income just
below the threshold for the 40-percent bracket. A reduction in that threshold hardly affects
the reward to working at all during the tax year but doubles the disincentive from the income
tax for working an additional week.
30For the purposes of considering non-poor workers, the CTC is a better analogy to the
EITC because neither is withheld during weeks not at work. In both countries, the income
concept for tax credits is essentially the same as the income subject to personal income tax,
even though the U.K.’s tax credits are administered as separate benefit programs.
31The federal government’s fiscal year is the year ending September 30. The fiscal year indi-
cates when safety net benefit program parameters are reset, and the nature of the federal bud-
geting, but not the time frame for performing the income test.
32The temporary benefit and eligibility rules for UI and food stamps are too numerous to
itemize here: see Mulligan (2012), especially chapter 3.
33The tax rates shown in Mulligan (2013) are composites of employment (2/3) and weekly
hours (1/3) tax rates. This paper is focused on employment tax rates only, so Fig. 6 reports
just the employment component of Mulligan (2013)’s composite. Because hardly any of the
composite tax rate changes come from weekly-hours tax rate changes, the results in Fig. 6
are essentially Mulligan (2013, Fig. 7) scaled by 3/2.
34That is, it is the absolute change in q as represented in equation (4).
Mulligan IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:23 Page 20 of 2735Food stamp work requirements have been repeatedly waved since 2009 (Mulligan
2015b). Other food stamp eligibility expansions are permanent in that new legislation would
be required for them to return to the pre-recession eligibility rules.
36The ACA disincentives more than offset the incentives that were created by the ex-
piration of the aforementioned temporary assistance programs.
37The adjusted CPI is the official CPI divided by one plus the consumption tax rate.
38In the notation of the paper, the employee reward is (1-q)y. The paper calculates
two q series for the median worker in each country: on credits versus off credits for the
U.K. and single versus married for the U.S. For the purpose of preparing Fig. 7, a
fixed-weighted average of the two series are used according to the proportions of
each situation in the adult population.
39Fuel and tobacco duty changes are the only non-VAT indirect tax rate changes consid-
ered in this paper. According to Institute for Fiscal Studies (2015), a few other changes oc-
curred 2008–13: alcohol duties increased by 6% in real terms in 2008 and then 2% in real
terms each subsequent year until 2013 (partial reversals followed in 2013), a 2011 change in
the carbon price floor for electricity generation, a new stamp duty land tax rate on large prop-
erties, and 2012 changes to vehicle excise duties. These changes are of less aggregate import-
ance than those for fuel and tobacco.
40For fuel, I (a) took the April 2007 retail price, £0.928/liter, reported by Vial (2012), (b)
backed out the non-VAT part of the retail price using the statutory VAT rate of 17.5%, and
(c) subtracted the specific excise rate of £0.5152/liter. For cigarettes, HM Revenue and Cus-
toms (2013b) reports a non-tax revenue per typically-priced pack of £0.9255 on March 31
2007.
41Note that sellers above the VAT-registration threshold pay the statutory rate on all of
their sales, even the sales below the threshold (Keen and Mintz 2004, Onji 2009). In theory,
sellers might optimally restrict their size to remain below the threshold, thereby generating
no VAT revenue but nonetheless having added marginal costs that reflect the existence of a
VAT. The small-seller exemption is just an example of a more general phenomenon: that the
marginal tax rate can exceed the average tax due to avoidance and noncompliance behaviors.
42In other words, a person reducing leisure would pay the statutory VAT rate on some of
his additional consumption, but not all of it. In this case, a revenue-based measure of the con-
sumption tax rate (Mendoza, Razin and Tesar 1994, Immervoll, et al. 2007, Adam 2005) will
more accurately represent incentives than the full statutory rate does.
430.066 is 0.86*0.44*(statutory VAT rate) for 2003–7. Recall from above that 0.86 is the ratio
of 2003–7 non-VAT revenue to VAT revenue. By using the 0.44 revenue ratio, I am assuming
that the non-VAT indirect taxes do not have the small-seller exemption (or other compliance
and enforcement features that create marginal costs without obtaining revenue). Because the
revenue ratio is VAT revenue divided by total consumption, 0.066 is effectively indirect tax
revenue divided by total consumption.
44The income-based JSA is also available to persons with weekly earnings (during periods
of employment) less than about £150, which is far below the range of earnings scenarios con-
sidered in this paper.
Appendix I: indirect tax rate changes in the U.K.
This appendix describes the paper’s treatment of non-VAT indirect taxes and VAT
exemptions for the purposes of measuring labor market tax wedges. Almost as much indirect
Mulligan IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:23 Page 21 of 27tax revenue is obtained from non-VAT taxes as from VAT taxes. On average between 2003
and 2007 (the five years prior to the crisis), fuel duty revenue was 32 percent of VAT revenue.
Tobacco duty revenue was 11 percent. “Other” revenue, including alcohol duties and other
excise taxes, was 44 percent, for a combined total of 86 percent of VAT revenue. Moreover,
the rates of the two largest excise taxes— fuel and tobacco— changed significantly.39
The excise taxes tend to be multiplicative with the VAT. Suppose, for example,
that a pack of cigarettes would cost £3 at retail without indirect taxes. Assuming
100% pass-through, a £2-per-pack specific excise tax (paid somewhere in the sup-
ply chain) would by itself make the retail price £5. Adding a 20% VAT, to be paid
by the seller, would make the total price £6, whereas the VAT-inclusive price ab-
sent excise tax would be £3.60. In the case of tobacco, there is also an ad valorem
excise tax, which is multiplicative as well because it includes both the specific tax
and the VAT tax as part of its base.
Given the VAT’s multiplicative implementation, the relative prices of excisable goods
can be calculated without regard for the VAT. For fuel (specifically, unleaded petrol
purchased at retail) and tobacco (specifically, a typically-priced pack of cigarettes) in
April 2007, I calculated the ratio of the specific excise rate to the non-tax revenue per
unit sold at retail.40 This ratio was made into a monthly time series according to
proportional changes over time in the CPI-adjusted excise rate applicable on the first
day of the month. One was added to transform the ratio into a pricing factor. The
tobacco-pricing factor was adjusted again by multiplying by one plus the applicable ad
valorem tobacco excise tax. Tax-year averages of the fuel and tobacco pricing factors
are displayed in Fig. 8. The tobacco factor rises, especially after 2009, whereas the fuel
factor falls. Both changes are due to changes in the legislated specific tax rates relative
to the CPI.Fig. 8 A Comparison of tobacco and fuel excise changes
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for national labor market analysis, I have calculated fuel-tobacco averages. The av-
erages are shown in black in Fig. 8, both using the relative excise revenue in 2003–
7 as weights. These averages suggest that the tobacco increases approximately offset
the fuel decreases from the perspective of taxing consumption relative to leisure.
Based on this finding, and in order to avoid introducing unimportant complications
in the tax-wedge estimation methodology, I therefore treat the non-VAT indirect-
tax rates as constant over time.
Putting aside non-VAT taxes for the moment, using statutory VAT rates as my
model (2)’s consumption tax rate would exaggerate the amount of revenue actually ob-
tained by the U.K.’s VAT. The OECD (2014, Table 3.A3.1) finds that the latter has been
44 percent of the former for each of the years 2008–12. Part of the discrepancy results
from the exemption of small businesses from VAT and from noncompliance. If
these were the entire discrepancy, and compliance were greater for large businesses
than for small, then the pricing impact of the VAT could either be more or less
than that of a full-compliance exemption-free VAT with the same statutory rate.41
But another part of the discrepancy results from the VAT-exemption of entire mar-
kets, such as health care and financial services, and reduced statutory rates in
other markets. If market exemptions and rate reductions were the only reason that
VAT revenue was low relative to the statutory standard rate, then revenue would
be a better indicator than the statutory standard rate of the wedge created by the
VAT between leisure and total consumption.42 HM Revenue and Customs (various
issues) has measured the degree to which the discrepancy derives from market
exemptions and rate reductions, and found for 2007 through 2013 that actual rev-
enue is about 63 percent of what it would be if there had not been market exemptions and
rate reductions. This paper therefore takes the VAT rate to be 63 percent of the statutory
standard rate.
The overall sales tax rate referenced in the text combines the time-varying VAT rate
(including the factor of 0.63) and a constant rate of 6.6 percent for the other indirect taxes ac-
cording to the formula (5)43:
1þ τc ¼ 1þ 0:63 statutory VAT rateð Þ½  1þ 0:066½  ð5Þ
With the statutory standard VAT rate equal to 15, 17.5, and 20, respectively, τc is 16.7,
18.4, and 20.1, respectively. Table 3 displays τc and all of the other U.K. tax parameters
needed to calculate the overall employment tax on a quarterly basis according to
equation (4).
Appendix II: additional perspectives on U.K. employment tax wedge changes
Figure 2 shows how U.K. tax law changes served to harmonize the personal income
tax (PIT) brackets with the national insurance contribution (NICs) brackets, from the
perspective of a full-year worker. However, Fig. 9 shows that gaps between the brackets
remain for part-year workers because the NICs are administered on a pay-period basis,
whereas PIT is based on tax-year income.
The paper shows significantly different employment tax wedge changes for married versus
unmarried workers in the U.S. Holding constant credit status (emphasized in the main text),
no such difference is seen in the U.K. largely because the NICs, the basic PIT, the
Table 3 U.K. Tax Parameters. For use in equation (4). Pounds are not inflation adjusted
NICs parameters y τi UB τc Overall wedge q (weekly employment)
Quarter PT ST Employer rate τf Employer rate τe Employer cost PIT basic CTC BRR Unempl. Benefit Consumption tax rate Off credits On credits
2007-Q1 £97 £97 12.8% 11.0% £445 22.0% 37.0% 18.8%
2007-Q2 £100 £100 12.8% 11.0% £446 22.0% 37.0% £59.15 18.8% 55.2% 79.5%
2007-Q3 £100 £100 12.8% 11.0% £449 22.0% 37.0% £59.15 18.8% 55.2% 79.5%
2007-Q4 £100 £100 12.8% 11.0% £451 22.0% 37.0% £59.15 18.8% 55.1% 79.4%
2008-Q1 £100 £100 12.8% 11.0% £464 22.0% 37.0% £59.15 18.8% 55.0% 79.4%
2008-Q2 £105 £105 12.8% 11.0% £460 20.0% 39.0% £60.50 18.8% 53.7% 79.4%
2008-Q3 £105 £105 12.8% 11.0% £468 20.0% 39.0% £60.50 18.8% 53.6% 79.3%
2008-Q4 £105 £105 12.8% 11.0% £474 20.0% 39.0% £60.50 18.2% 53.4% 79.2%
2009-Q1 £105 £105 12.8% 11.0% £472 20.0% 39.0% £60.50 17.0% 52.9% 79.0%
2009-Q2 £110 £110 12.8% 11.0% £488 20.0% 39.0% £64.30 17.0% 53.1% 79.1%
2009-Q3 £110 £110 12.8% 11.0% £482 20.0% 39.0% £64.30 17.0% 53.2% 79.1%
2009-Q4 £110 £110 12.8% 11.0% £493 20.0% 39.0% £64.30 17.0% 53.1% 79.1%
2010-Q1 £110 £110 12.8% 11.0% £491 20.0% 39.0% £64.30 18.8% 53.8% 79.4%
2010-Q2 £110 £110 12.8% 11.0% £494 20.0% 39.0% £65.45 18.8% 53.9% 79.5%
2010-Q3 £110 £110 12.8% 11.0% £492 20.0% 39.0% £65.45 18.8% 53.9% 79.5%
2010-Q4 £110 £110 12.8% 11.0% £495 20.0% 39.0% £65.45 18.8% 53.9% 79.5%
2011-Q1 £110 £110 12.8% 11.0% £497 20.0% 39.0% £65.45 20.5% 54.5% 79.8%
2011-Q2 £139 £136 13.8% 12.0% £493 20.0% 41.0% £67.50 20.5% 54.8% 81.2%
2011-Q3 £139 £136 13.8% 12.0% £493 20.0% 41.0% £67.50 20.5% 54.8% 81.2%
2011-Q4 £139 £136 13.8% 12.0% £502 20.0% 41.0% £67.50 20.5% 54.7% 81.2%
2012-Q1 £139 £136 13.8% 12.0% £502 20.0% 41.0% £67.50 20.5% 54.7% 81.2%
2012-Q2 £146 £144 13.8% 12.0% £506 20.0% 41.0% £71.00 20.5% 54.9% 81.2%












Table 3 U.K. Tax Parameters. For use in equation (4). Pounds are not inflation adjusted (Continued)
2012-Q4 £146 £144 13.8% 12.0% £515 20.0% 41.0% £71.00 20.5% 54.8% 81.2%
2013-Q1 £146 £144 13.8% 12.0% £515 20.0% 41.0% £71.00 20.5% 54.8% 81.2%
2013-Q2 £149 £148 13.8% 12.0% £524 20.0% 41.0% £71.70 20.5% 54.7% 81.2%
2013-Q3 £149 £148 13.8% 12.0% £505 20.0% 41.0% £71.70 20.5% 54.9% 81.2%












Fig. 9 UK income tax brackets, combining PIT & NIC
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(recall footnote 4). Persons who have been unemployed more than 26 weeks potentially re-
ceive an income-based job seekers allowance, which pays more to married than to unmarried
job seekers if the spouse is working less than 24 h per week.44 But, as shown in Fig. 10, this
provision by itself has not changed enough to produce significantly different (in the economic
sense) U.K. incentive dynamics by type of JSA, which is related to marital status.Fig. 10 U.K. employment tax wedge, 2007-13
Mulligan IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:23 Page 26 of 27Competing interests
The IZA Journal of Labor Policy is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The author declares
that he has observed these principles.Acknowledgements
I appreciate the financial support of the George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State and
discussions with Kyle Herkenhoff, and comments from David Neumark and an anonymous referee.
Responsible editor: David Neumark
Received: 18 March 2015 Accepted: 22 August 2015
References
Adam S (2005) Measuring the Marginal Efficiency Cost of Redistribution in the UK. Institute for Fiscal Studies Working
Paper, no. 05/14
Adam S, Browne J (2013) Do the UK Government's welfare reforms make work pay? IFS working paper, no. 13/26
BBC (2015) Economy Tracker: Unemployment. http://www.bbc.com/news/10604117 (accessed February 8, 2015).
Brewer M, Browne J, Hood A, Robert J, Sibieta L (2013) The Short- and Medium-term Impacts of the Recession on the
UK Income Distribution. Fisc Stud 33(2):179–201
Gomes P (2012) Labour market flows: Facts from the United Kingdom. Labour Econ 19(2):165–75
HM Government (2015a) Tax credits: your payment dates. gov.uk. https://www.gov.uk/when-is-your-next-tax-credits-
payment (accessed February 13, 2015).
HM Government (2015b) Benefits & credits: Jobseeker's Allowance (JSA). gov.uk. https://www.gov.uk/jobseekers-
allowance/print (accessed July 6, 2015).
HM Government (2015c) Income Tax. gov.uk. https://www.gov.uk/income-tax/overview (accessed February 13, 2015).
HM Revenue and Customs (2009a) Calculation of Entitlement. Tax Credits Technical Manual. https://web.archive.org/
web/20090714131643/http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/tctmanual/TCTM07000.htm (accessed August 15, 2015).
HM Revenue and Customs (2009b) Claims and Notification. Tax Credits Technical Manual. https://web.archive.org/web/
20090714131633/http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/tctmanual/TCTM06000.htm (accessed August 15, 2015).
HM Revenue and Customs (2013a) Child and Working Tax Credits statistics: finalised annual awards: 2011 to 2012.
Personal Tax Credits Statistics. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
260067/cwtc-awards.pdf (accessed August 15, 2015).
HM Revenue and Customs (2013b) Tobacco Factsheet. Tax & Duty Bulletins. https://www.uktradeinfo.com/Statistics/
Statistical%20Factsheets/Tobacco_Factsheet_2013.xls (accessed July 1, 2015).
HM Revenue and Customs (2014a) Main Features of National Insurance Contributions. Tax structure and parameters
statistics. https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/main-features-of-national-insurance-contributions (accessed
January 21, 2015).
HM Revenue and Customs (2014b) Accounting for VAT when the standard rate of VAT returned to 17.5 percent." VAT
rates, thresholds, fuel scale charges and exchange rates. http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/vat/forms-rates/rates/rate-
changes.htm (accessed January 22, 2015).
HM Revenue and Customs (2014c) Income Tax Liabilities Statistics 2011–12 to 2014–15. Income Tax Statistics and Distributions.
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/income-tax-liabilities-statistics-tax-year-2011-to-2012-to-tax-year-2014-to-2015
(accessed January 22, 2015).
HM Revenue and Customs (2014d) Rates of Income Tax: 1990–91 to 2014–15. Tax Structure and Parameters Statistics.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/418669/Table-a2.pdf (accessed January
23, 2015).
HM Revenue and Customs (2014e) Income Tax Personal Allowances and Reliefs: 1990–91 to 2014–15. Tax Structure and
Parameters Statistics. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/418665/
Table-a1.pdf (accessed January 23, 2015).
HM Revenue and Customs (2015) Numbers of taxpayers and registered traders. https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/424585/Apr15_Numbertaxpayerstraders_bulletin_v0.1.pdf (accessed
August 15, 2015).
HM Revenue and Customs: Main Tax Expenditures and Structure Reliefs. Tax expenditures, reliefs and ready reckoners
statistics. various issues. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/389539/
20141231_expenditure_reliefs_v0.3.pdf (accessed August 15, 2015).
HM Treasury (2013) Tax and tax credit rates and thresholds for 2014–15. Autumn Statement 2013. https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/tax-and-tax-credit-rates-and-thresholds-for-2014-15/tax-and-tax-credit-rates-and-
thresholds-for-2014-15 (accessed July 7, 2015).
Immervoll H, Kleven HJ, Kreiner CT, Saez E (2007) Welfare Reform in European Countries: A Microsimulation Analysis.
Economic J 117:1–44
Institute for Fiscal Studies (2015) Tax Measures Introduced in each Budget and PBR since 1979. Fiscal Facts. http://
www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/publications/ff/budget_measures.xls (accessed July 1, 2015).
Keen M, Mintz J (2004) The Optimal Threshold for a Value-Added Tax. J Public Econ 88(3–4):559–76
KPMG (2013) United Kingdom: VAT essentials. kpmg.com. https://web.archive.org/web/20150618111351/http://
www.kpmg.com/global/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/vat-gst-essentials/pages/united-kingdom.aspx
(accessed January 22, 2015).
Mendoza EG, Razin A, Tesar LL (1994) Effective Tax Rates in Macroeconomics: Cross-country Estimates of Tax Rates on
Factor Incomes and Consumption. J Monet Econ 34(3):297–323
Mulligan CB (2012) The Redistribution Recession. Oxford University Press, New York, redistributionrecession.com
Mulligan IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:23 Page 27 of 27Mulligan, CB (2013) Recent Marginal Labor Income Tax Changes by Skill and Marital Status. Tax Policy and the
Economy: 69–100
Mulligan, CB (2014) Side Effects: The Economic Consequences of the Health Reform. (acasideeffects.com).
Mulligan, CB (2015a) The New Full-time Employment Taxes. Tax Policy and the Economy
Mulligan, CB (2015b) The New Employment and Income Taxes. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
OECD (2012) Taxing Wages 2011. OECD Publishing, Paris
OECD (2014) Consumption Tax Trends 2014. OECD Publishing
Office for Budget Responsibility (2015) Economic and Fiscal Outlook - March 2015. Controller of Her Majesty’s
Stationery Office
Office for National Statistics (2012) Families and Households, 2001 to 2011. http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/family-demography/
families-and-households/2011/rft-tables_1-to-8.xls (accessed August 15, 2015).
Office for National Statistics (2013) Table P01UK. 2011 Census, Population Estimates. http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/
2011-census/population-estimates-by-five-year-age-bands–and-household-estimates–for-local-authorities-in-the-united-
kingdom/rft-table-p01uk.xls (accessed August 15, 2015).
Office for National Statistics (2014a) Distribution of Gross Hourly Earnings of Employees. Labour Market Statistics. http://
www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/lms/labour-market-statistics/december-2014/table-earn08.xls (accessed January 20, 2015).
Office for National Statistics (2014b) Employment, Unemployment, and Economic Inactivity by Age Group. Labour Market
Statistics. http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/lms/labour-market-statistics/may-2014/table-a05.xls (accessed June 27, 2015).
Onji K (2009) The response of firms to eligibility thresholds: Evidence from the Japanese value-added tax. J Public Econ
93(5–6):766–75
Tax Policy Center (2014) Taxation and the Family: What is the Earned Income Tax Credit? The Tax Policy Briefing Book.
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/key-elements/family/eitc.cfm (accessed July 6, 2015).
Vial A (2012) UK fuel price: how has it changed over time? The Guardian. online edition.Submit your manuscript to a 
journal and beneﬁ t from:
7 Convenient online submission
7 Rigorous peer review
7 Immediate publication on acceptance
7 Open access: articles freely available online
7 High visibility within the ﬁ eld
7 Retaining the copyright to your article
    Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropen.com
